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The transmission of photons through open-air or an optical fiber is an important primitive in quan-
tum information processing. Theoretical description of such a transmission process often considers
only a single photon as the information carrier and thus fails to accurately describe experimental op-
tical implementations where any number of photons may enter a detector. It is important to bridge
this big gap between experimental implementations and the theoretical description. One powerful
method that emerges from recent efforts to achieve this goal is to consider a squash model that con-
ceptually converts multi-photon states to single-photon states, thereby justifying the equivalence
between theory and experiments. However, up to now, only a limited number of protocols admit a
squash model; furthermore, a no-go theorem has been proven which appears to rule out the existence
of a universal squash model. Here, we observe that an apparently necessary condition demanded
by all existing squash models to preserve measurement statistics is too stringent a requirement for
many protocols. By chopping this requirement, we show that rather surprisingly, a universal squash
model actually exists for a wide range of protocols including quantum key distribution protocols,
quantum state tomography, the testing of Bell’s inequalities, and entanglement verification, despite
the standard no-go theorem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 02.50.Tt, 03.65.Ta, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics opens up new ways to process in-
formation. Quantum information processing (QIP) al-
lows tasks not possible in classical information process-
ing, such as non-local correlations [1, 2], and uncondition-
ally secure schemes for cryptography [3–5], randomness
generation [6], and data hiding [7, 8]. One of the great-
est triumphs of QIP to date is quantum key distribution
(QKD) (a.k.a. quantum cryptography), which allows two
distant users to share a secret (as a classical bit string)
by sending quantum states over a quantum channel. Due
to the ease of generation, transmission, and detection,
photons are often used as information carrier in many
quantum communication [9] tasks including QKD (see,
e.g., [10–12]), teleportation (see, e.g., [13–16]), super-
dense coding (see, e.g., [17–19]), and quantum networks
(see, e.g., [20, 21]).
In many quantum communication schemes (such as the
most well-known QKD protocol – the Bennett-Brassard-
1984 protocol [3] – and quantum state tomography [22]),
the analyses often work on the assumption that the
quantum channel presents single-photon signals to a re-
ceiver. These signals are subsequently measured with
single-photon measurements. However, in practice, ex-
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perimental equipment fall short in guaranteeing such a
pure single-photon environment. This is because prac-
tical photon sources occasionally emit more than one
photon, and the detection setup for implementing the
qubit measurement is usually composed of threshold de-
tectors (such as standard InGaAs or silicon avalanche
photo-diodes). Threshold detectors only produce a click
if the input signal contains one or more photons; thus,
they are incapable of revealing the number of photons
entering the detection setup. This immediately raises a
key question: does this mean that all single-photon-based
quantum communication schemes cannot run as expected
from their original design and analyses? For example,
it is unclear whether a single-photon-based QKD proto-
col can still provide unconditional security when multi-
photon signals are received from the quantum channel.
Also, in quantum state tomography, it is unclear whether
we can ascribe a single-photon description to a state that
we measure when such a state comes from a source that
occasionally emits multi-photon signals.
The problem was initially motivated by QKD [23–25],
but was realized to be important in other QIP tasks such
as entanglement verification [25, 26]. This is because
many QIP tasks also rely on qubits as the basis of analy-
sis but they do not carry the immediate security concern
of QKD that an intelligent eavesdropper may meticu-
lously align her strategy with the practical detectors’ be-
haviour. Our goal is to bridge the idealization of qubit-
based quantum communications and the physical real-
ization where multi-photon signals may be emitted from
2the source and/or received from the quantum channel.
Indeed, the significance of this gap was demonstrated by
Semenov and Vogel [27] who showed that the mismatch
between the theoretical single-photon consideration and
the actual experimental reality with multi-photon signals
might produce a fake violation of Bell’s inequality and
even quantum physics [28].
While we address this QKD-motivated problem in the
QKD context, our discussion applies equally to other
contexts including quantum state tomography. Indeed,
later in the paper, we will show that quantum state
tomography technique can be also be applied to a de-
tection setup with threshold detectors. Also, we note
that there is a deep connection between the security
of QKD and the testing of Bell’s inequality which was
first mentioned by Ekert [4] in 1991 and was subse-
quently demonstrated through the idea of “self-testing”
for QKD [29, 30], device-independent QKD based on
Bell’s inequality [31, 32], and state tomography based
on Bell’s inequality [33].
QKD can be either prepare-and-measure or
entanglement-based. In the former, one party Al-
ice prepares a quantum state and sends it to another
party Bob who immediately measures it upon reception,
and in the latter, an entanglement source generates a
pair of entangled quantum states to be distributed to
the two parties. The multi-photon problem arises on
the source side for prepare-and-measure QKD protocols
because a phase-randomized weak coherent source is
often used to simulate a single-photon source. Since the
multiple photons in an emitted signal are modulated to
carry the same information, extra copies of quantum
information is available to Eve. The multi-photon
problem on the receiver side arises from the use of
threshold detectors in both type of QKD schemes.
Existing efforts in setting up actual QKD experi-
ments involving threshold detectors and multiple-photon
sources as well as in proving the unconditional security
of QKD schemes using ideal apparatus [34–38] will not
be wasted if one can slightly modify the post-processing
procedure, the security proof, or the existing experimen-
tal setup using currently available technologies. Along
this line of thought, the multi-photon problem at the
source (for prepare-and-measure schemes) was solved by
Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus, and Preskill (GLLP) [23]
with great performance enhancement from using decoy
states [39–41] (see also Ref. [42]).
On the other hand, the threshold detection prob-
lem at the receiver (for both prepare-and-measure and
entanglement-based schemes) can be solved by concep-
tually assuming a quantum operation before Bob that
maps Eve’s multi-photon states to single-photon states.
GLLP called this a squash operation [23] (see Fig. 1).
If an actual squashing device were concatenated to the
multi-photon quantum channel, we would have an effec-
tive single-photon quantum channel emitting only sin-
gle photons. Such a physical squashing device would
immediately make the receiving side of the experimen-
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FIG. 1. The squash operation is a valid quantum operation
that maps a multi-photon input state to a single-photon out-
put state. The practical source together with the squash oper-
ation can be regarded as a single-photon source. The practical
measurement on the multi-photon signal consists of threshold
detectors and is argued in this paper to be statistically re-
lated to the combination of a universal squash operation and
an ideal qubit measurement. Here, for simplicity, we use pho-
ton sources to also mean quantum channels.
tal setup compatible with the single-photon-based anal-
yses. Although such a squashing device is impractical,
the squashing approach can still be used to justify the
conceptual presence of a squashing device, which is not
always possible. Actually, the squash operation was fully
justified only in a few security proofs for the BB84 [24, 25]
and the BBM92 protocols [24]. These squash-operation-
based security proofs are rather specific and do not pro-
vide a universal way to translate Eve’s attack that out-
puts a multi-photon state to an attack that outputs
a single-photon state. In particular, a squash map is
proved to not exist for the six-state QKD scheme with ac-
tive basis selection [25] which is a scheme first introduced
by Bennett et al. [43] and later by Bruß [44]. In summary,
previous works [45] show that a universal squash does not
exist. This is a highly disappointing result because it ap-
pears to mean that for each protocol, one has to prove its
security by a different method because one cannot apply
a universal squash operation.
Despite the previous no-go theorem, here we show that
a universal squash actually exists. The previous no-
go theorem rests on a rather strong assumption that a
squash map must be able to reproduce the precise mea-
surement statistics (e.g., error rates). Preserving the
statistics is a rather stringent requirement. The suc-
cess of our approach lies in that we do not attempt to
reproduce the exact statistics of the conceptual squash
situation and we recognize that most quantum proto-
cols do not need knowledge of exact statistics to func-
3tion (bounds on statistics also suffice). Indeed, by relax-
ing this requirement and allowing a universal squash to
produce only bounds on statistics, we show that, rather
surprisingly, a universal squash actually exists. Con-
sequently, many security proofs for single-photon QKD
protocols (with active or passive basis selection) includ-
ing the six-state protocol [44], three-states protocols [46],
the SARG04 protocol (with four or six states) [47], theN -
basis protocol [48], and protocols using decoy states [39–
41], multi-partite quantum cryptographic protocols [49],
reference-frame independent QKD [50], two-way proto-
cols [51] directly carry over to practical implementations
with a weak-coherent-state source and threshold detec-
tors. This amounts to immense simplification. We em-
phasize that, in addition to QKD, our work also applies
to quantum state tomography, the testing of Bell’s in-
equalities, and entanglement verification. Later in this
paper, we will discuss the application of our universal
squash model to quantum state tomography and the test-
ing of Bell’s inequalities. Here, we remark that while the
protocol-specific squashing approach of Ref. [25] has also
been applied to entanglement verification [26], our ap-
proach has the advantage of being protocol independent
(i.e., universal) and being applicable in many different
contexts including quantum state tomography.
The organization of our paper is as follows. We discuss
our proof on universal squash model in Sec. II followed
by a discussion on the special treatment for the key bits
in QKD in Sec. III. We then apply our universal squash
model to QKD protocols in Sec. IV, quantum state to-
mography in Sec. V, and the testing of Bell’s inequality
in Sec. VI. We conclude in Sec. VII.
II. UNIVERSAL SQUASH MODEL
We discuss our result assuming the following settings:
• The incoming photons are restricted to a single op-
tical spatio-temporal mode and information is en-
coding in polarization. Note that there is no loss of
generality in our discussion because phase encoding
is mathematically equivalent to polarization encod-
ing.
• For simplicity, we assume that Bob uses active basis
selection for his measurements so that his detection
system projects the incoming signal onto the eigen-
states of only one basis. (We extend it to the case
of passive basis selection in Appendix C.)
• Bob’s detection system consists of two threshold de-
tectors plus possibly other linear optical elements
(a representative structure is shown in Fig. 2). All
photons in the same spatio-temporal mode enter-
ing each detector will be measured and collapsed
individually. In other words, the projection oper-
ators describing the measurement of each individ-
ual photon commute and are independent of each
D1 
D0 
Input pulse 
WP 
PBS 
FIG. 2. Detection system used by Bob for one basis, where a
set of waveplates (WP) select the basis and a polarizing beam-
splitter (PBS) splits the signal into two arms for detection by
two threshold detectors (D0 and D1). Here, the incoming sig-
nal consists of three photons and one is (two are) collapsed in
detector D0 (D1).
other. Even though we focus on a two-detector re-
ceiver, for simplicity of discussion, our proof works
with any number of detectors where multiple clicks
may occur.
• The threshold detectors have perfect efficiencies
and no dark counts. Therefore, all incoming pho-
tons are collapsed. Inefficient detectors may be
modeled as perfectly efficient detectors followed by
a beamsplitter, which may be absorbed into the
channel.
• Quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements
are implicitly assumed, without loss of generality,
to be used by Bob to determine the input photon
number throughout the proof. The presence of the
QND measurements is consistent with the thresh-
old detector model and does not affect the func-
tioning of it.
Our proof can be illustrated pictorially as shown in
Fig. 3. The essence is to link the real situation (with
threshold detectors and the possibility of double-click
events) to an ideal situation (consisting of a universal
squash operation), which are Situation 3 and Situation
1, respectively, in Fig. 3. This linking is established by
regarding the two situations as statistically equivalent
to special cases of classical post-processing for a detec-
tion setup with photon-number-resolving (PNR) detec-
tors (Situations 2 and 4). Both Situations 2 and 4 can
be derived from Situation 5, which is a detection setup
with PNR detectors that outputs the full information on
the number of photons detected in each detector. We
discuss the elements of our proof as follows.
A. State representation
We write an n-photon pure state in tensor product
form and then impose bosonic symmetry by symmetriz-
ing the state [52]. Similarly, an n-photon mixed state can
be dealt with as a mixture of pure states. Let ρ denote
the density matrix of an n-photon state. A squash opera-
tion is a quantum operation that takes an n-photon state
as input and produces a single-photon state as output.
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FIG. 3. Relationship map for the five situations used to prove our universal squash model. The goal is to link the real situation
(Situation 3) with the ideal situation (Situation 1) consisting of the universal squash operation.
In Situation 1 (a virtual protocol), an n-photon state enters a detection system comprising the squash operation Λn→1, a set of
waveplates (acting as unitary transform U), a polarizing beamsplitter, and two detectors. The universal squash operation Λn→1
maps n photons to one. We do not specify whether the detectors are photon-number-resolving (PNR) or threshold detectors
since after the squash operation, only one photon remains. The output of the detection system is a bit value corresponding to
the detector that has a click. This is a single-qubit situation since we can regard the squash operation as part of the channel. In
Situation 2 (a virtual protocol), an n-photon state enters a detection system comprising a set of waveplates (acting as unitary
transform U⊗n), a polarizing beamsplitter, and two PNR detectors, followed by a classical post-processor. The classical post-
processor serves as the classical analog of the squash operation Λn→1 and outputs a bit value according to probabilities given
by the detectors’ clicks. More concretely, suppose that detectors D0 and D1 register k0 and k1 photons respectively. Then, the
classical post-processor in Situation 2 outputs event “bit i” (i = 0, 1) with probability ki/(k0 + k1).
We show in Theorem 1 that the bit value outputs of Situations 1 and 2 have the same statistics for any n-photon input state
and any unitary transform U (see Supplementary Materials for proof).
Situation 3 (the real protocol) is the similar to Situation 2 with the PNR detectors replaced by threshold detectors. Situation
3 outputs event “bit i” if only detector Di clicks (i = 0, 1) and event “double-click” if both detectors click. Situation 4 is
also similar to Situation 2 with a difference in the post-processing part. Here, the post-processing only announces one of three
events corresponding to a single-click for “0”, a single-click for “1”, and a double-click. It is easy to see that the Situations 3
and 4 produce the same output statistics for the same input state. In this paper, we consider only those protocols for which
Situations 3 and 4 are equivalent.
Situation 5 is the mother protocol that derives Situations 2 and 4. Note that the detection parts of Situations 2,4, and 5 are
all the same; only their classical processing parts are different. In fact, the classical processing parts of Situations 2 and 4 can
be generated by that of Situation 5 which outputs the full information on the numbers of detection clicks.
5B. Universal squash operation
We define our universal squash operation as the map-
ping from ρ to ρqubit where ρqubit = Tr(ρ) over any n− 1
photons is the reduced density matrix of one photon. It
does not matter which n − 1 photons we trace over and
the same ρqubit will result due to the bosonic symmetry.
We denote this mapping as Λn→1(ρ) = ρqubit. Note that
Λn→1 is a valid quantum operation.
C. Equivalence of Situations 1 and 2
Theorem 1. Situations 1 and 2 are equivalent and pro-
duce the same output statistics for any unitary transform
and any n-qubit input state.
This result is non-trivial and its proof is discussed in
Appendices A 1 and A2. The main point is that a uni-
versal squash operation (Situation 1) can be regarded as
a special classical post-processing method for a detection
system with PNR detectors (Situation 2). Theorem 1
justifies an effective single-qubit channel since the squash
operation in Situation 1 can be regarded as part of the
channel. This means that it is valid to apply the result
of any single-qubit-based analysis to Situation 2.
D. Equivalence of Situations 3 and 4
It is easy to see that the real situation with threshold
detectors (Situation 3) is equivalent to another special
classical post-processing method for a detection system
with PNR detectors (Situation 4).
E. Relationship between Situations 2 and 4
Situations 2 and 4 are related through Situation 5
(shown in Fig. 3). Since both Situations 2 and 4 are spe-
cial cases of classical post-processing for a detection sys-
tem with PNR detectors, they can both be derived from
the same situation – Situation 5. Thus, the statistics of
Situation 4 can be used to infer some statistics about Sit-
uation 2. For QKD protocols, the statistics of interest is
the error rate eb between Alice and Bob in basis b. Thus,
we aim at providing bounds on the error rates. A single-
click in Situation 4 immediately tells us that a definite bit
value would have been obtained in Situation 2 and this
bit value is directly used for the evaluation of the error
rates. On the other hand, a double-click in Situation 4
does not tell us which bit value it corresponds to in Sit-
uation 2, and there is no definite bit value to be used for
the error-rate evaluation. To overcome this, we recognize
that we do not need to know the definite bit value since all
we care are bounds on the error rates. Our key idea is to
bound the range of possible error rates by using the most
pessimistic and optimistic values for double-click events.
Specifically, a double-click event contributes as an error
bit for the calculation of the upper bound on the error
rate and contributes as a correct bit for the lower bound.
Suppose that the number of test bits for basis b is Nb,
where Nb = N
s,c
b +N
s,e
b +N
d
b . Here, N
s,c
b , N
s,e
b , and N
d
b
are the correct single-click events, erroneous single-click
events, and double-click events, respectively. Then, the
error rate of the test bits is bounded by
eLb =
N s,eb
Nb
≤ eb ≤ N
s,e
b +N
d
b
Nb
= eUb . (1)
Corollary 1. (Single-qubit description) We regard the
original quantum channel followed by the squash oper-
ation Λn→1 in Situation 1 as the effective single-qubit
quantum channel. Thus, we can ascribe a single-qubit
description to the actual received signals and the associ-
ated channel error statistics are bounded by Eq. (1).
This allows us to apply any single-qubit-based security
analysis to qubit-based QKD protocols whose qubit as-
sumption is violated in practical implementation due to
the reception of multi-photons.
Note that there are two such effective single-qubit
quantum channels for entanglement-based QKD proto-
cols (in which an entanglement source sends two signals
one to Bob and one to Alice).
III. POST-SELECTION OF KEY BITS IN QKD
In QKD protocols, one subset of the data obtained
from the quantum channel (called the test bits) is de-
voted to estimating the statistics of the channel and an-
other subset (called the key bits) for key generation. The
key bits are eventually transformed into the final secret
key through a series of classical operations and commu-
nications.
The bounds established above given in Eq. (1) apply to
the channel output states irrespective of whether they are
used as test bits or key bits. Since we actually need to use
the bit values of the key bits, we propose to discard all the
double-click key bits for which we do not know the values.
This post-selection procedure requires us to extend the
bounds of Eq. (1) when applied to the remaining key bits
since we need to take into account the most pessimistic
and optimistic error statistics of the discarded bits
More specifically, if we had known the value of every
key bit in Situation 2, we would have directly applied
a qubit-based security proof to distill a final secret key.
However, we are in Situation 4 (or Situation 3, the real
situation), and we do not know the key bit value for
double-click events. To solve this problem, our strategy
is to discard all double-click key bits and augment the
error rate bounds of Eq. (1) for describing the remaining
key bits. Eventually, we will come up with new bounds
for the error rates for the key after discarding:
ekey,Lb ≤ ekeyb ≤ ekey,Ub . (2)
6To aid discussion, we designate one basis as the key-
generating basis, denoted as basis b∗. All key bits are
detected in this basis and thus all single- or double-click
events are classified according to this basis. We first con-
sider the b-basis error rate, where b 6= b∗. Because the key
bits discarded according to whether it is a double-click
event in the b∗-basis may have any error rate in other
bases, the lower and upper bounds on the error rate ekeyb
in the b-basis for the remaining key bits are:
ekey,Lb =
eLbN
key
b∗ −Nkey,db∗
Nkey,sb∗
ekey,Ub =
eUb N
key
b∗
Nkey,sb∗
, for b 6= b∗
(3)
where Nkey,sb∗ (N
key,d
b∗ ) is the number of single-click
(double-click) events among all the Nkeyb∗ = N
key,s
b∗ +
Nkey,db∗ key bits measured in basis b
∗. Here, the lower
(upper) bound comes from assuming that the b∗-basis
double-click events discarded correspond to erroneous
(correct) bits in the b-basis.
The b∗-basis error rate of the key bits after discarding
double clicks can be inferred from the b∗-basis error rate
of the single-click test bits. In the asymptotic case, these
two error rates are the same, and are given by excluding
the double-click events in Eq. (1):
ekeyb∗ =
N s,eb∗
N s,cb∗ +N
s,e
b∗
. (4)
Eqs. (2)-(4) describe the key bits measured in the
b∗-basis after discarding double-click events. Classical
post-processing steps derived from a qubit-based secu-
rity proof can then be used to distill a final secret from
the key bits according to these equations. Also, we only
need to consider physical states that satisfy the error rate
constraints given in Eqs. (2)-(4); unphysical states need
not be considered.
The key distillation steps are usually composed of two
parts: error correction (EC) and privacy amplification
(PA). EC and PA are classical procedures for correcting
errors between Alice’s and Bob’s initial keys and for re-
moving Eve’s information about their keys, respectively.
The codes/schemes and the associated parameters for EC
and PA are determined from Eqs. (2)-(4) according to the
security proof for the particular QKD protocol.
A. QKD post-processing with error-rate ranges
We emphasize that our method involves EC and PA
that operate on error rates given in ranges where the
lower bound is not necessarily zero. Note that most real-
istic EC codes are already designed to correct errors up to
a certain error rate starting from zero. Also, PA schemes
based on phase error correction using random hashing or
random codes [34–36] and those based on information-
theoretic proofs using universal hashing [37, 38] chosen
according to the worst-case error rates automatically tol-
erate intermediate error rates.
Note that correlation between the different bases,
which are reflected in the error rates and the structure of
their respective bases (e.g., as in the six-state protocol),
can be exploited by choosing the EC code and the PA
scheme appropriately. To compute the asymptotic key
generation rate, it is sufficient to consider the worst-case
physical state (see examples in Sec. IV).
IV. QKD EXAMPLES
A. Six-state QKD protocol
Considering the asymptotic case, suppose that Alice
and Bob observe that their measurement results on the
test bits for bases X , Y , and Z all have the same erro-
neous single-click rate ǫ, double-click rate δ, and correct
single-click rate 1 − δ − ǫ. [53] This induces the follow-
ing bounds on the asymptotic error probabilities on the
key bits (before discarding double-clicks) according to
Eq. (1):
ǫ ≤ eX , eY , eZ ≤ ǫ+ δ. (5)
The key bits are measured in the Z-basis and double-click
key bits are discarded. After discarding, the error rate
in the Z-basis of the post-selected key bits is given by
Eq. (4) due to direct inference from the test bits and the
error rates in the other bases are bounded with Eq. (3):
ekeyZ =
ǫ
1− δ
ǫ− δ
1− δ ≤ e
key
X , e
key
Y ≤
ǫ+ δ
1− δ .
(6)
The key generation rate for the six-state protocol with
one-way error reconciliation is (cf. Ref. [54]):
Rsix-state = min
b1,b2,b3
(1− δ)
[
1− h
(
b1, b2, b3, 1−
3∑
i=1
bi
)]
(7)
subject to ekeyZ = b1 + b2, e
key
X = b2 + b3, e
key
Y = b1 + b3,
and Eq. (6), where h(b1, b2, . . .) = −
∑
i bi log bi. The
minimum is achieved with, under some condition, (see
Appendix B)
b1 =
ǫ
1− δ − b2 (8)
b3 =
ǫ+ δ
1− δ − b2 (9)
b2 =
ǫ− 2δ
2(1− δ) . (10)
Note that in the limit that δ goes to zero, b1 = b2 =
b3, and we recover the standard result in single-photon-
based six-state QKD. This shows that at small double-
click rates, the six-state protocol still gives a higher key
7rate than the BB84 protocol [55]. In practice, the double-
click rate with a weak-coherent-state source is usually
pretty small, since the average source intensity is usually
less than one photon per pulse and the fiber medium
incurs signal loss. Thus, applying our universal squash
model to the six-state protocol in practice does not incur
much loss due to the pessimistic error-rate estimation and
the discarding of double-click key bits. This shows the
power of our universal squash model in security proofs.
B. The BB84 protocol
Similar to the example on the six-state protocol, sup-
pose that Alice and Bob observe that their measurement
results on the test bits for bases X , Y , and Z all have
the same erroneous single-click rate ǫ, double-click rate
δ, and correct single-click rate 1− δ− ǫ. This induces the
following bounds on the asymptotic error probabilities:
ǫ ≤ eX , eZ ≤ ǫ+ δ. (11)
The key bits are measured in the Z-basis and double-
click key bits are discarded. After discarding, the error
rate in the Z-basis of the post-selected key bits is ǫ due
to direct inference from the test bits (cf. Eq. (4)) and
the error rate in the X-basis is bounded with Eq. (3):
ekeyZ =
ǫ
1− δ
ǫ− δ
1− δ ≤ e
key
X ≤
ǫ+ δ
1− δ
(12)
The key generation rate with one-way reconciliation is
thus [35, 36, 38, 56]
RBB84 = (1 − δ)
[
1− h2
(
ǫ
1− δ
)
− h2
(
ǫ+ δ
1− δ
)]
.
(13)
The squash model of Ref. [24, 25] for the BB84 proto-
col preserve the measurement statistics when the double-
click events are randomly assigned a bit value. Their key
rate without discarding double-click events is
R′BB84 = 1− 2h2(ǫ + δ/2). (14)
Figure 4 shows that our universal squash model given
in Eq. (13) has similar performance as or even some-
times outperforms the statistics-preserving squash model
of Ref. [24, 25] given in Eq. (14). This is because we al-
low double-click key bits to be discarded in our model.
For fair comparison, we also consider the key rate of
the statistics-preserving squash model with discarding
double-click key bits:
R′′BB84 = (1− δ)
[
1− h2
(
ǫ
1− δ
)
− h2
(
ǫ+ δ2
1− δ
)]
.
(15)
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FIG. 4. Dependence of the key rate R per detected signal on
the double-click rate δ. The solid curves are for our univer-
sal squash model (Eq. (13)) and the dotted curves and the
dashed curves are for the BB84-specific squash model [24, 25]
(Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) respectively).
Here, the first entropic term corresponds to bit error cor-
rection and the bit error rate is obtained with Eq. (4);
the second entropic term corresponds to phase error cor-
rection and the phase error rate is upper bounded by as-
suming that all the double-click key bits discarded have
no phase error and re-normalizing the phase error rate of
the initial set of key bits ǫ+ δ2 by the size of the final set.
Figure 4 compares the two models, and it shows that
substantive difference exists between RBB84 and R
′′
BB84
when the double-click rate is large. However, in practice,
the double-click rate is usually quite small.
C. BB84 in realistic setting
We consider the performance of our universal squash
model in the realistic setting with a weak coherent state
source and the decoy-state method. Suppose that Alice
uses a phase-randomized weak-coherent-state source that
emits signals of photon number n with the Poisson dis-
tributed probability pµ,n =
e−µµn
n! where µ is the mean
photon number. Typically, µ is small and on the order
of 1 (e.g., µ = 0.5). The yield, Yn, is the probability
that Bob gets a detection (either a single-click event or
a double-click event) given that Alice sent an n-photon
signal. For a state generated by the source with inten-
sity µ, the gain, defined as the probability that Bob has
a detection and Alice sent an n-photon state, is
Qµ,n = pµ,nYn. (16)
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FIG. 5. Dependence of the key rate per transmitted signal on
distance. The solid curves are for our universal squash model
(Eqs. (23) and (25)) and the dashed curves are for the BB84-
specific squash model [24, 25] (Eqs. (27) and (25)). Optimal
µ is used at every distance. Here, we used the experimen-
tal parameters for signals at wavelength 1550 nm from the
Gobby-Yuan-Shields experiments [57]: α = 0.21 dB/km and
ηBob = 4.5% .
The overall gain, single-click error rate, single-click cor-
rect rate, and double-click rate, are, respectively
Qµ =
∞∑
n=0
pµ,nYn (17)
QµF
s,e
µ =
∞∑
n=0
pµ,nYnF
s,e
n (18)
QµF
s,c
µ =
∞∑
n=0
pµ,nYnF
s,c
n (19)
QµF
d
µ =
∞∑
n=0
pµ,nYnF
d
n (20)
where
F s,en + F
s,c
n + F
d
n = 1 ∀n (21)
and the three terms in the last equation are the single-
click error rate, single-click correct rate, and double-click
rate on n-photon states sent by Alice.
To estimate the channel parameters, we use the infi-
nite decoy state protocol [40] in which we vary the source
intensity µ continuously to generate infinitely many de-
coy states that form a system of linear equations from
Eqs. (17)-(20). We expect that a finite decoy state
method will give similar results [41, 58]. The decoy states
are solely for parameter estimation, and solving this sys-
tem of equations gives Yn, F
s,e
n , F
s,c
n , and F
d
n for all n.
Since we now know the single-click error rate, single-click
correct rate, and double-click rate for the single-photon
states emitted by Alice, we can compute the worst-case
single-photon error rates in our universal squash model
in the same manner as in the previous analysis for single-
photon sources. According to Eq. (1), they are bounded
by
F s,e1 ≤ eX,1, eZ,1 ≤ F s,e1 + F d1 . (22)
The key bits are measured in the Z-basis and double-
click key bits are discarded. After discarding, the single-
photon error rate in the X-basis is bounded as in Eq. (3)
to be
ekeyX,1 ≤
F s,e1 + F
d
1
1− F d1
= ekey,UX,1 . (23)
Since we correct all Z-basis errors for all states with any
photon number, the overall error rate in the Z-basis of
the post-selected key bits is given by Eq. (4) to be
ekeyZ,µ¯ =
F s,eµ¯
F s,eµ¯ + F
s,c
µ¯
. (24)
Here, we use µ¯ to represent the intensity for the key-
generating signal states. The key rate, according to
Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill [23], is
RBB84,decoy = −Qµ¯(1 − F dµ¯ )h2
(
ekeyZ,µ¯
)
+
Qµ¯,1(1− F d1 )
[
1− h2
(
ekey,UX,1
)]
. (25)
9We assume the following simulation model to repre-
sent Eve’s control over the channel parameters, Yn, F
s,e
n ,
F s,cn , and F
d
n . Each photon has a certain transmission
probability ηch = 10
−αl
10 of not being lost in the fiber op-
tic channel where α in dB/km is the loss coefficient of
the fiber and l in km is the length of the fiber. Also,
Bob’s detectors have a certain detection efficiency ηBob
for detecting an input photon. Thus, the probability for
a single photon to be detected by Bob is η = ηchηBob.
The yield is
Yn = 1− (1− η)n. (26)
Since we do not assume the detectors to have dark counts,
a single-photon signal emitted by Alice will at most pro-
duce one click on Bob’s side if the signal goes through
a passive channel. Thus, for illustration purpose, we
assume that Eve actively introduces multiple photons
to Bob and her attack induces F s,en = ǫ, F
d
n = δ, and
F s,cn = 1 − ǫ − δ for all n. Figure 5 shows the key gen-
eration rates using this simulation model. Results for
our universal squash model and the statistics-preserving
squash model of Ref. [24, 25] specific to BB84 are shown.
The key rate for the latter case is given by Eq. (25) with
ekey,UX,1 =
F s,e1 + F
d
1 /2
1− F d1
. (27)
As shown in the figure, the performance degradation of
our universal squash model is small when the single-click
error rate ǫ is small or the double-click rate δ is small.
Note that there is no cutoff distance for both cases since
we do not assume the detectors to have dark counts.
V. QUBIT STATE TOMOGRAPHY
In many qubit state tomography experiments (e.g.,
[59, 60]), photons often are not generated from true
single-photon sources. When non-ideal sources and
threshold detectors are used, without a squash model it
is unclear whether one can talk about determining the
qubit state since multi-photon signals may be emitted.
On the other hand, our universal squash approach allows
quantum state tomography techniques to be rigorously
applied even to detection setups with non-ideal sources
and threshold detectors. After a squash operation, a
state is reduced to that of a qubit and one can deter-
mine tomographically the state of the resulting qubit.
We emphasized that our universal squash model can also
be applied to multi-qubit tomography [61]. The overall
argument for applying our universal squash model to to-
mography is similar to that for QKD, with a difference
in the statistics of interest involved. Here, as shown be-
low, we are interested in the average measurement value
instead of the error rate. Standard qubit state tomog-
raphy using the Stokes parameters [62] involves mea-
suring the polarization of identical single-photon states
ρ in an ensemble using the three bases X , Y , and Z.
The Pauli matrices are W = |0W 〉〈0W | − |1W 〉〈1W |
where W = X,Y, Z, and |bX〉 = (|0Z〉 + (−1)b|1Z〉)/
√
2,
|bY 〉 = (|0Z〉+(−1)bi|1Z〉)/
√
2, b = 0, 1. The density ma-
trix of the qubit ρ can be tomographically determined to
be
ρ =
1
2
I +
1
2
∑
W=X,Y,Z
Tr(ρW )W. (28)
We now discuss how to bound the parameters Tr(ρW )
when non-ideal sources and threshold detectors are used.
Suppose that we measure basis W with a threshold de-
tection setup in Fig. 2 for NW number of signals. Ac-
cording to the measurement outcomes, we decompose the
signals into three parts: NW = N
s,+
W +N
s,−
W +N
d
W where
N s,±W and N
d
W are the single-click events corresponding to
the ±1 outcome of the measurement W and double-click
events, respectively. Then, Tr(ρW ) is bounded by
N s,+W −N s,−W −NdW
NW
≤ Tr(ρW )
≤ N
s,+
W −N s,−W +NdW
NW
.
(29)
Using these bounds and Tr(ρI) = 1, we can obtain a
set of consistent qubit states using Eq. (28). Essentially,
our universal squash model allows one to ascribe a qubit
description to the output states.
VI. TESTING OF BELL’S INEQUALITY
We can use our result to derive bounds on Bell’s in-
equality [1] violation which may subsequently be used for
qubit state tomography. Here, the statistics of interest
comes from the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) in-
equality [2] (perhaps the most famous Bell-type inequal-
ity [1]) which considers the statistics χ = E[A1B1] +
E[A1B2]+E[A2B1]−E[A2B2], where E[AiBj ] = 〈ψ|Ai⊗
Bj |ψ〉 is the expectation value of the bipartite state |ψ〉
with {−1,+1}-valued observables Ai, Bj , i, j = 1, 2. The
maximum value of χ in quantum mechanics is 2
√
2 which
can be achieved by a maximally entangled state, while
the maximum value of χ for states consistent with local
hidden variable (LHV) models is 2. Thus, any experi-
ment showing a violation of χ > 2 will rule out LHV
theories. However, so far, no conclusive experimental vi-
olation [63–73] exists due to the difficulties in closing the
locality, detection, and postselection loopholes.
It should be emphasized that for the purpose of ruling
out LHV theories, any such experiments do not have to
assume quantum mechanics to hold, let alone a quantum
channel that emits qubit signals. In this case, when a
double-click event occurs, one may apply any bit assign-
ment scheme (such as a random bit assignment scheme)
to this event without regard to the question of compati-
bility with any qubit squash model. On the other hand,
our universal squash model becomes relevant when the
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CHSH violation is used in a quantum context. We may
consider the problem of characterizing a multi-photon
pair source with respect to a perfectly entangled qubit
pair source by checking the measurement statistics of the
actual source. This is in the spirit of the idea of self-
testing quantum apparatus first proposed by Mayers and
Yao [29, 30]. Along a similar line are device-independent
QKD based on Bell’s inequality [31, 32] and state tomog-
raphy based on Bell’s inequality [33].
To illustrate the applicability of our model to Bell’s
inequality testing, let us consider quantum state tomog-
raphy based on Bell’s inequality [33]. Bardyn et al. [33]
have considered the problem of quantifying the closeness
of an unknown entangled state emitted by a black box
to ideal entangled states by simply testing the unknown
state for its CHSH violation. For entanglement sources
that emit qubit pairs, they showed that the fidelity F
for characterizing the closeness to maximally entangled
two-qubit states is bounded by
F ≥ (1 +
√
[χobs/2]2 − 1)/2 (30)
where χobs is the observed CHSH violation. Our result al-
lows the application of Eq. (30) even in situations where
practical entanglement sources that may emit pairs of
multi-photon signals and threshold detectors are used.
In the end, we may regard the practical source as a two-
qubit entangled source having certain fidelity to a maxi-
mally entangled state.
For the CHSH-inequality test, suppose that the num-
ber of bits for bases Ai and Bj is NAiBj , which can
be decomposed as NAiBj = N
s,+
AiBj
+ N s,−AiBj + N
d
AiBj
where N s,±AiBj and N
d
AiBj
are the single-click events corre-
sponding to the ±1 outcome of the measurement Ai⊗Bj
and double-click events, respectively. Then, E[AiBj ] is
bounded by
ELij =
N s,+AiBj −N
s,−
AiBj
−NdAiBj
NAiBj
≤ E[AiBj ]
≤
N s,+AiBj −N
s,−
AiBj
+NdAiBj
NAiBj
= EUij ,
(31)
and the CHSH violation χ can be bounded by combining
the corresponding bounds for the various E[AiBj ]’s:
EL11 + E
L
12 + E
L
21 − EU22 ≤ χ
≤ EU11 + EU12 + EU21 − EL22.
(32)
Corollary 2. (CHSH-based source estimation) We re-
gard the original entangled state processed by the squash
operation Λn→1 on each side of the state in Situation 1 as
the effective two-qubit state. We bound the CHSH viola-
tion of the effective two-qubit state using Eqs. (31)-(32)
and infer its fidelity with Eq. (30).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The use of threshold detectors has been a major obsta-
cle in bridging the practical experiments on quantum pro-
tocols and their theoretical qubit-based analyses. In this
paper, we provide a universal solution to this for a wide
range of protocols including single-qubit-based schemes
for QKD, quantum state tomography, and entanglement
verification. This allows the translation of existing anal-
yses that assume single-photon inputs to ones that can
handle multiple-photon inputs detected with threshold
detectors. For future work, it will be interesting to ex-
plore the applicability of our universal squash model in
other contexts such as quantum metrology [74] and linear
optics quantum computation [75].
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
1. Statistical Equivalence of Situations 1 and 2 for
projective measurements
We show that the bit value outputs of Situations 1 and
2 have the same statistics for any n-photon input state
and any unitary transform. This result is non-trivial
since it means that the quantum squash operation can be
perfectly substituted by a classical operation. We show
this by proving that (i) the squash operation commutes
with the unitary transform and (ii) directly verifying that
the statistics of a single-photon detection after squash is
the same as the statistics of a multi-photon detection
followed by our classical post-processor.
For (i), it follows from the fact that the original state ρ
lives in a tensor product space of n qubits and standard
linear optics transformations act on each photon sepa-
rately. Thus, when the transformation is characterized
by a unitary transform U on one qubit, the transforma-
tion on the n-qubit state is ρ′ := U⊗nρ(U †)⊗n. It can
easily be checked that Λn→1(ρ
′) = UΛn→1(ρ)U
†. Here,
U † denotes the adjoint of U .
For (ii), we consider whether the statistics of a single-
photon detection after squashing ρ′ is the same as the
statistics of a PNR detection on ρ′ followed by our clas-
sical post-processor. We can verify this by comparing
the probabilities of producing bits “0” and “1” in the
two cases. In some sense this means that squash com-
mutes with the final detection. Due to the bosonic sym-
metry, the state ρ′ is symmetric on exchange of the pho-
tons (e.g., 〈001|ρ′|001〉 = 〈010|ρ′|010〉 = 〈100|ρ′|100〉 for
a 3-photon state ρ′). In light of this symmetry, we de-
note the probability of ρ′ collapsing to |x〉 in a PNR
detection as λn−k,k := 〈x|ρ′|x〉 where x is an n-bit
string containing n − k “0”s and k “1”s. For example,
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〈001|ρ′|001〉 = 〈010|ρ′|010〉 = 〈100|ρ′|100〉 = λ2,1. Nor-
malization gives
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
λn−k,k = 1.
We now consider the outcome probabilities in Situa-
tion 2 where the detectors are PNR and their results are
processed by a classical post-processor whose behaviour
is defined in Fig. 3. In general, for an n-photon state,
pCP0 =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
n− k
n
λn−k,k (A1)
pCP1 =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
k
n
λn−k,k. (A2)
Next, we consider the outcome probabilities in Situ-
ation 1 where a squash is followed by a single-photon
detection. The probability of getting 0 is
pSQ0 = 〈0|Λn→1(ρ′)|0〉. (A3)
Expanding the partial trace of the squash operation with
the assumption of tracing over qubits 2 to n, we get
pSQ0 =
∑
i2,...,in=0,1
〈0i2 · · · in|ρ′|0i2 · · · in〉 (A4)
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
λn−k,k. (A5)
Similarly, the probability of getting 1 is
pSQ1 =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
λk,n−k. (A6)
It can be easily checked that pCP0 = p
SQ
0 and p
CP
1 =
pSQ1 for all n. This means that the squash operation
commutes with the final detection. Since (i) works for
any arbitrary basis, this proves Theorem 1. Note that
here we only focus on projective measurements. However,
Theorem 1 also holds for generalized measurements (see
Subsection A2 next).
Had we used PNR detectors in practice (i.e., Situa-
tion 2), we would apply Theorem 1 to argue that we had a
quantum channel that emits a single qubit to be detected
since the squash operation in Situation 1 in connection
with the original multi-qubit channel can be regarded as
an effective single-qubit channel. This means that it is
valid to apply the result of any single-qubit-based analy-
sis. However, when we use threshold detectors instead of
PNR detectors, we have to make additional arguments,
through Situations 3, 4, and 5, to justify the use of single-
qubit-based analyses.
2. Statistical equivalence of Situations 1 and 2 for
generalized measurements
We show that Theorem 1 also holds for generalized
measurements by extending the proof of the previous
Subsection A1. Suppose that the detection setup in Sit-
uations 1 and 2 is a POVM {Mi, i = 1, . . . ,m} on a
qubit instead of a simple projection onto {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}.
The ith PNR detector in Situation 2 indicates the num-
ber of clicks ni for the POVM element Mi. Due to the
bosonic symmetry of the n-photon state ρ′ [76], we de-
note the probability of collapsing it to (x1, . . . , xn) in the
PNR detection in Situation 2 as λn1,...,nm := Tr(Mx1 ⊗
· · · ⊗ Mxnρ′) where x1, . . . , xn each contains a POVM
element index [1,m] and there are ni number of them
with index i. For example, Tr(M1⊗M1⊗M2⊗M3ρ′) =
Tr(M3⊗M1⊗M2⊗M1ρ′) = λ2,1,1 for a 3-element POVM
(m = 3) and a 4-photon state (n = 4). Normalization
gives
∑
n1+···+nm=n
n1,...,nm≥0
(
n
n1, . . . , nm
)
λn1,...,nm = 1. (A7)
We define the classical post-processor in Situation 2
to output outcome i ∈ [1, . . . ,m] with probability ni/n,
when there are ni photons detected in the ith PNR de-
tector. Thus, the probability of getting outcome i in
Situation 2 is
pCPi =
∑
n1+···+nm=n
n1,...,nm≥0
(
n
n1, . . . , nm
)
ni
n
λn1,...,nm . (A8)
We now turn to the probability of getting outcome i
in Situation 1:
pSQi = Tr(MiΛn→1(ρ
′)). (A9)
We arbitrarily choose to trace over photons 2 to n:
Λn→1(ρ
′) =Tr2,...,n(ρ
′)
=Tr2,...,n

 ∑
x2,...,xn
∈[1,m]
Mx2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mxnρ′

 .
(A10)
Thus, we have
pSQi =
∑
x2,...,xn
∈[1,m]
Tr(Mi ⊗Mx2 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mxnρ′) (A11)
=
∑
n1+···+nm=n−1
n1,...,nm≥0
(
n− 1
n1, . . . , nm
)
λn1,...,ni+1,...,nm
which can easily be verified to be equal to Eq. (A8). That
is pCPi = p
SQ
i for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Appendix B: Derivation for the six-state QKD
protocol
The constraints for the six-state protocol are
ekeyZ = b1 + b2, (B1)
ekeyX = b2 + b3, (B2)
ekeyY = b1 + b3. (B3)
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We first find b2 as follows:
b2 =
ekeyZ + e
key
X − ekeyY
2
(B4)
which, using Eq. (6), implies
ǫ− 2δ
2(1− δ) ≤ b2 ≤
ǫ+ 2δ
2(1− δ) . (B5)
The entropy term in the key rate expression in Eq. (7)
can be broken down into a sum of a bit-error-correction
term and a phase-error-correction term:
h (b0, b1, b2, b3) = H(Z) +H(X |Z) (B6)
where
H(Z) = h2(e
key
Z ) (B7)
H(X |Z) = (1− ekeyZ )h2
(
b3
1− ekeyZ
)
+
ekeyZ h2
(
b2
ekeyZ
)
(B8)
b0 = 1−
3∑
i=1
bi (B9)
h2(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). (B10)
We can substitute b3 = e
key
X − b2 in Eq. (B8) and maxi-
mize H(X |Z) over b2 given its range in Eq. (B5) for fixed
ekeyZ and e
key
X . Without the constraint of Eq. (B5) (i.e.,
the BB84 case), the maximizing value is b2 = e
key
Z e
key
X .
For simplicity, we assume that 2δ ≪ ǫ≪ 1/2 so that the
lower bound of b2 in Eq. (B5) is greater than the upper
bound of ekeyZ e
key
X . Since H(X |Z) is a concave function in
b2, this lower bound of b2 is the maximizing value when
taking into account the constraint of Eq. (B5). Next,
we choose the largest possible value for ekeyX in order to
maximize H(X |Z). Thus, we arrive at Eqs. (8)-(10).
Appendix C: Passive basis selection
We only consider uniform basis detection here. This
means that for a B-basis scheme, the initial received
light path is split equally into B paths. A pas-
sive detection setup consists of orthogonal projections
in multiple bases (see Fig. 6). We can regard that
there is only one POVM measurement having many el-
ements. In the case of passive BB84, the POVM is
{ 12 |0z〉〈0z|, 12 |1z〉〈1z|, 12 |0x〉〈0x|, 12 |1x〉〈1x|}. Due to Ap-
pendix A2, the statistics of Situations 1 and 2 are equiv-
alent even in the passive-basis-selection case. This estab-
lishes one link in the overall argument depicted in Fig. 3.
The next step is to establish the other link — the relation
between the statistics that are actually observed in Sit-
uation 3 (or equivalently Situation 4) and the statistics
of the ideal Situation 2. Unlike the active-basis-selection
D1 
D0 
Input pulse 
PBS 
D1 
D0 
PBS 
BS 
WP2 
WP1 
FIG. 6. Detection system used by Bob with passive basis
selection among two bases, where a beamsplitter (BS) splits
the incoming signal into two paths corresponding to the two
bases, two sets of waveplates (WP1 and WP2) each select one
of the bases, and a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) splits the
signal into two arms for detection by two threshold detectors
(D0 and D1). Here, the incoming signal consists of three
photons and one is (two are) collapsed in detector D0 of the
first basis (detector D1 of the second basis).
case, the statistics of Situation 2 here have two parts: one
for the error rates of the bit values, and one for the statis-
tics of the basis values. Here, we separately consider the
two.
We argue that the statistics of basis values in Situa-
tion 4 is the same as that of Situation 1 (or equivalently
Situation 2), when we adopt a particular basis selection
rule for multi-basis events. Thus, once a basis is selected
with this rule, it only remains to consider the relation
for the bit-value statistics. Fortunately, this second part
is the same as that of the active-basis-selection case and
we can reuse the previous argument to estimate the error
rates with the test bits and discard the double-click key
bits.
Now we prove that the basis statistics of Situation
4 with the basis selection rule is the same as the ba-
sis statistics of Situation 1. Obviously, in Situation 1,
the single photon emitted from the squash operation col-
lapses in each of the B bases with probability 1/B. In
Situation 4, we use the following basis selection rule:
• When only one basis has detection, we choose this
basis.
• When b ≤ B bases have detection, we choose one
among these b bases with uniform probability 1/b.
The main point is to show that a basisA chosen according
to this rule occurs with probability 1/B, i.e., same as
Situation 1. This probability for an n-photon input state
is as follows:
P (A) :=
B∑
b=1
1
b
(
B − 1
b− 1
)
Pr{detection in b bases
including basis A} (C1)
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where
Pb := Pr{detection in b bases including basis A}
=
(
b
B
)n
−
b−1∑
c=1
(
b
b− c
)
Pb−c (C2)
Here, Pb is defined in terms of a fixed set of b bases of
which basis A is an element. The first term in Eq. (C2)
represents the probability that each of the n photons col-
lapses in any one basis of this set. Since this term also
includes the events that the n photons collapse in less
than b bases, we exclude these events in the second term.
Rewriting Eq. (C1) as
P (A) =
B−1∑
b=1
1
b
(
B − 1
b− 1
)
Pb +
1
B
PB (C3)
and substituting the expression for PB from Eq. (C2), we
get
P (A) =
1
B
. (C4)
This means that by adopting this basis selection rule,
the basis statistics of Situation 1 is preserved. The ap-
proach to deal with the bit-value statistics is the same
as the active-basis-selection case and we can reuse that
result to handle the double-click events and to estimate
the error rates.
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